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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER PRODUCER SALES
IN THE STATE OF PRODUCTION
J. RICHARD TIANO*
INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Natural Gas Act, it intended to close
the regulatory gap caused by several Supreme Court decisions' which
prevented the regulation of rates and services of interstate pipelines
to local gas distribution companies. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana2
stated that the intent of the statute was "clear and complete" and
Congress had used "unusual legislative precision" when it delegated
to the Federal Power Commission (Commission) regulatory authority
over (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2)
the sale for resale in interstate commerce; and (3) natural gas com-
panies engaged in such transportation or sales.3 Congress' intent
underlying the Act was that Commission regulation should comple-
ment, not supplant, state regulation of the natural gas industry.4
Until 1954, the Commission construed its mandate as requiring it
to regulate only the chain of distribution of natural gas from the
point where an interstate pipeline acquired it.' In Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin,6 the Supreme Court concluded that independent
producers, selling gas to interstate pipelines, were natural gas com-
panies within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act.7 Because the
wellhead price charged by producers was, thereafter, subject to regu-
lation by the Commission,8 producers not surprisingly attempted to
restrict by contract the use of gas sold to interstate pipelines in order
* Attorney, Reed & Priest, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Solicitor Federal Power Commission
1970-72; A.B.J.D. Georgetown University.
1. E.g., Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924);Public
Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
2. 332 U.S. 507 (1947). The Supreme Court recently cited the Panhandle opinion with
approval. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
3. 332 U.S. at 516.
4. Id. at 517.
5. See, e.g., Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 200 (1939).
6. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1970).
8. For a discussion of the Commission's efforts to set wellhead prices, see generally,
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC 417 U.S. 283 (1974);Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968).
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to avoid federal sales regulation. 9 Employing a "commingling"
theory, the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over producers
selling gas to a pipeline for the latter's own use was sustained by the
Supreme Court in California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co." 0
There are two cases' ' presently pending before the Commission
wherein the issue is whether producers selling gas to an interstate
pipeline are subject to federal regulation if none of the gas sold flows
across a state line. This question appears to be one of first impres-
sion. The purpose of this article will be to consider the relevant
precedents bearing on this jurisdictional issue and, hopefully, reach a
conclusion with respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over such
producer sales.
THE LO-VACA CASE
In the Lo-Vaca case," 2 El Paso Natural Gas Company entered into
contracts with Lo-Vaca Gathering Company and Houston Pipe Line
Company to purchase gas to be used by El Paso as compressor fuel.
Lo-Vaca's gas was to be used in El Paso's system outside the State of
Texas; Houston's gas was to be used in El Paso's compressors in the
State of Texas. Both contracts prohibited the resale of the contract
gas by El Paso and required metering to assure that El Paso's con-
sumption of gas from the commingled stream of gas would exceed
the amount of gas supplied under the contracts.' " The Commission
asserted jurisdiction over the producers on the grounds that the
proposed sales of contract gas would be sales in interstate commerce
for resale.' I
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the physical
commingling of gas sold under the contracts did not destroy its
non-jurisdictional status.' I The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld
the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction.' 6 The Court observed
that, as a result of prior decisions,' I the sale of gas which crosses a
state line "at any stage of its movement from well-head to ultimate
9. E.g., United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392 (1965);
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 370 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966);Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.
FPC, 339 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1964), rev., 381 U.S. 762 (1965).
10. 379 U.S. 366 (1965).
11. Coloraao Interstate Gas Co., Docket Nos. CP75-323, et al.; Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corp., Docket Nos. RP73-65, et al.
12. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F.P.C. 606 (1961).
13. Id. at 608, 610.
14. Id. at 611.
15. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. F.P.C., 323 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963).
16. See note 10 supra.
17. E.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. F.P.C, 324 U.S. 515 (1945).
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consumption" constitutes a sale in interstate commerce.' 8 Although
the Court appeared to reaffirm that an engineering test is the bench-
mark in establishing jurisdiction, t 9 the Court went on to say that the
fact that "a substantial part of the gas will be resold, in our view,
involves federal jurisdiction at the outset over the entire transac-
tion." 2 0 This result was mandated to avoid discrimination in favor of
nonjurisdictional customers. 2 The Court, however, noted that it
was not reaching the question whether there may be non-jurisdic-
tional sales in spite of the commingling of non-jurisdictional gas with
jurisdictional gas.' 2
Later that same term, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
FPC v. Amerada Petroleum Corp."2  wherein Commission jurisdiction
was upheld as to gas delivery contracts which expressly provided that
all gas purchased would be transported, delivered and consumed
within the State of North Dakota. While the majority in Amerada
stated that the case was "on all fours" with Lo-Vaca,2 I Justice Gold-
berg in his concurring opinion noted that the result would be dif-
ferent if identifiable volumes of producers' gas could be traced to
points of consumption in the state of production.2
At least three conclusions can be drawn from the Lo-Vaca and
Amerada cases. First, Commission jurisdiction is established by the
physical tracing of gas out of the state of its origin. Indeed, in Lo-
Vaca and Amerada, the fact that gas was removed from the pipeline
to be consumed within the state of origin was not decisive since the
gas, a fungible commodity, was commingled with gas leaving the
state of production. To this extent, the Lo-Vaca and Amerada cases
were consistent with prior decisions that emphasized that jurisdiction
was determined by "an engineering and scientific, rather than a
legalistic or governmental test." Second, contractual restrictions will
not foreclose the attachment of federal sales jurisdiction. If contracts
were given dispositive weight, large volumes of a fungible commodity
would move in interstate commerce and, because the gas volumes are
fungible, the significant economic fact is that the gas would be resold
without any federal regulation. An "attractive gap" in the regulatory
scheme would emerge and such a result would be contrary to Con-
18. 379 U.S. at 369.
19. Only recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle. FP.C. v. Florida Power
&Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
20. 379 U.S. at 369.
21. Id. at 370.
22. Id. at 370.
23. 379 U.S. 687 (1965).
24. Id. at 690.
25. Id. at 691.
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gress' intent to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory
scheme. Third, the question of jurisdiction over sales made by pro-
ducers in the state of origin if, in fact, no gas was able to leave the
state was not decided. The pipelines in the Lo-Vaca and Amerada
cases purchased gas which flowed in systems ultimately crossing state
lines. Given the fungibility of gas, some of the producers' gas neces-
sarily entered interstate commerce as defined in Section 2(7) of the
Act.2 6
THE FLORIDA PARISHES DECISION
While the Lo-Vaca and Amerada cases dealt specifically with Com-
mission jurisdiction over producers since the pipelines were unques-
tionably interstate pipelines, the Commission subsequently con-
sidered the extent of its jurisdiction over pipeline facilities in light of
these precedents. In United Gas Pipe Line Co.,2 7 United filed a
petition for a declaratory order to determine whether sales to certain
Louisiana communities were subject to the Commission's jurisdic-
tion. The source of the gas for sales to 21 communities was an
onshore production field in Louisiana and there was no evidence that
any offshore federal domain gas was used to serve these loads. Sales
to other communities were made with gas produced in the offshore
federal domain. While the Presiding Examiner concluded that these
sales were intrastate,2 8 the Commission disagreed, asserting that the
Presiding Examiner "fundamentally erred in segregating into sales
characterized as being made from the Lirette-Mobile line or the
Kosciusko line."2 In the Commission's view, this dichotomy over-
looked that United operated a fully integrated pipeline and "the
most important consideration" was that the gas sold as "part of a
single, uniform stream" flowing through the system from the point
of production to customers in other states. 3" Therefore, it con-
cluded that removal of a portion of gas from an interstate stream did
not transform the gas into intrastate gas. Moreover, the Commission
rejected the view that, because the gas never left the state of produc-
tion, it was intrastate gas and stated:
[I] n the instant case there is only one uniform and indistinguishable
flow of gas, a very small portion of which is siphoned off before
leaving the state. Until the gas reaches the point of separation, there
is no way of knowing which part of the gas will not continue into
26. 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7).
27. 30 F.P.C. 560 (1963).
28. Id. at 580 et seq.
29. Id. at 562.
30. Id. at 563.
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other states. The stream of gas once having acquired an interstate
character, a part of it cannot be said to lose that character by virtue
of being resold within Louisiana.31
In conclusion, the Commission claimed that it would be irrational for
Congress to establish federal sales jurisdiction at one end of a pipe-
line but would exclude the same sales to consumers at the other
end.32 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 3  held that the Lo-Vaca and
Amerada cases "definitely settled" the Commission's jurisdiction
over the entire transaction from the outset.34
While prior cases held that sales for resale in the state of produc-
tion are subject to federal regulation even though no state line was
crossed,3 the Florida Parishes case is significant because of its
reliance on the commingling theory to establish jurisdiction over
pipeline sales. It is important to note that the producers selling gas to
United in the Florida Parishes cases were assumed to be subject to
Commission jurisdiction. 3 6 To this extent, this decision is distin-
guishable from the Lo-Vaca and Amerada cases where the issue was
the extent of jurisdiction over the producer-sellers. Second, in the
Florida Parishes case, the commingled gas stream from which the
Louisiana sales were made left the state of production. Since there
was a continuous flow of gas across state lines, United's operations
are indistinguishable from the pipeline systems in the Lo-Vaca and
Amerada cases.
THE GREEN SYSTEM CASE
The Lo-Vaca, Amerada and Florida Parishes cases all involved
pipeline systems crossing state boundaries. The Commission, how-
ever, has not been content to limit the commingling theory to such
situations. In its Opinion No. 610,1 7 the Commission concluded that
the injection of interstate gas into the intrastate Green System-East
subjected that system to the Commission's jurisdiction. While the
Commission found that the Green System-East was part of an inte-
grated interstate system and some gas left the state,3 8 the Com-
31. Id. at 566-67 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 567-68.
33. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. F.P.C, 359 F.2d 525 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 833 (1966).
34. Id. at 528.
35. E.g., Deep South Oil v. F.P.C., 257 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
930 (1958).
36. Id. at 563. The opinion of Commissioner O'Connor noted that the facts surrounding
the producer sales were not developed on the record. Id. at 576.
37. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 47 F.P.C. 245 (1972).
38. Id. at 257.
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mission qualified this finding in Opinion 610-A3 9 asserting that it
was intended only to show that gas from the Green System-East was
commingled with gas moving in interstate commerce. In its decision,
however, the Commission made it clear that the commingling of
interstate gas with intrastate gas and "the delivering of gas to intra-
state markets from interstate pipelines are sufficient integration of
interstate and intrastate operations to bring the uncertificated sales
and facilities within the Commission's jurisdiction." '4 I Having found
that United's facilities were jurisdictional, the Commission noted
that there was a "question" of its jurisdiction over the producers
"both before and after" the unauthorized commingling of gas by
United but it did not decide this question.4
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 4 2 Although recognizing
that the Commission rested its assertion of jurisdiction on the com-
mingling theory, it rejected contentions that the flows of gas into the
Green System-East were irregular and minimal, stating that it was
deferring to the Commission's expertise. The Court noted that it did
not consider the question whether federal jurisdiction would attach
if the flow of gas were de minimis and irregular.4 3 In light of the
Commission's decision to leave open the question of its jurisdiction
over the producers, there was no need for the Court to address itself
to this issue.
In the Green System case, unlike the Lo-Vaca, Amerada and
Florida Parishes cases, there was no commingled gas flowing out of
Louisiana although there were flows of commingled gas out of the
Green System into Mid Louisiana Gas Company's system. To this
extent, the Green System case represents a departure from those
cases and constitutes an extension of the commingling doctrine.
Indeed, commingling appears to become the touchstone of Commis-
sion jurisdiction. Under this view, it would seem that any com-
mingling of gas within the state of production would make all
intrastate gas sold subject to Commission jurisdiction. While the
Commission left open the question of its jurisdiction over the pro-
ducer sales, it is logical to conclude that, before United injected
interstate gas into the Green System, the sales were non-jurisdictional
but became jurisdictional after interstate gas was commingled with
39. 47 F.P.C. 1021, 1022 (1972).
40. 47 F.P.C. at 262.
41. Id. at 268.
42. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. F.P.C., 483 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub nom. Texasgulf, Inc. v. F.P.C, 416 U.S. 974 (1974).
43. Id. at 632. In contrast, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to engraft a de
minimus exception to Commission jurisdiction. F.P.C. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404
U.S. 453 (1972).
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the intrastate gas into the Green System. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to state the conclusion; its validity will be discussed below.
The second important facet of the Green System case is the
Commission's emphasis on the integrated operations of United's
system. This same factor was present in the Florida Parishes case and
constituted one of the pertinent factors in determining the juris-
dictional question. Since jurisdiction over producer sales was the
focal issue in Lo-Vaca and Amerada, the integrated operations theory
was unnecessary to the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Before discussing the extent of federal regulation of intrastate
wellhead sales of gas to interstate pipelines if such gas never leaves
the state of origin, it is important to consider the relevant provisions
of the Natural Gas Act. Section 1 (b) indicates that Congress intended
to regulate "the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale"
and that section plainly provides that the Act was not applicable "to
any other . . . sale of natural gas." 4 Congress carefully defined
"interstate commerce" to mean "commerce between any point in a
state and any point thereof, or between points within the same state
but through any place outside thereof. . . ."' Reading these sections
together, it is clear that a producer sale is within Section l(b) if it
can be shown that the gas ultimately flows out of the state of origin,
even if it is eventually consumed in the state of production. Indeed,
both the House and Senate4 6 Committee reports considered the
definition of "interstate commerce" to be "self-explanatory." Since
a producer's sale is the first step in the distribution chain of gas
across a state line, federal jurisdiction exists.4 It seems equally clear
that, if Sections l(b) and 2(7) are read together, not all wholesale
sales are within the ambit of the Act. For example, a wellhead sale
made by a producer directly to a distribution company, which also
receives gas from an interstate pipeline would not be subject to
federal regulation. This situation would be indistinguishable from
one where the distributor owned the well and attached the reserves
to its system for ultimate sales. Also, wholesale sales made by a
company receiving gas within or at the boundary of a state are not
subject to Commission jurisdiction if the gas is ultimately consumed
within that state and the rates and services are regulated by the state
44. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7) (1970).
46. H.R. Rep. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 4; S. Rep. 1162, 75 Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. See
generally Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, Libert, 44 Geo. L.J. 695 (1956).
47. See note 38 supra.
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commission.4 ' Thus, the question of federal jurisdiction over whole-
sale sales must be resolved by identifying the factual circumstances
surrounding the sale with due consideration to Congress' intent to
enact legislation complimenting, but not superseding, state regula-
tion.
THE IMPACT OF THE COMMINGLING DOCTRINE ON
INTRASTATE PRODUCER SALES
The Green System case presented one factual situation wherein
the question of federal jurisdiction over the producer sales would
arise. In such a case, a producer would be selling gas to an interstate
pipeline which is interconnected at either end to facilitate crossing
state lines although not necessarily belonging to the pipeline pur-
chaser. A second situation would involve sales to an interstate pipe-
line within the state in which the pipeline's facilities terminate. In
both cases, intrastate gas would be commingled with interstate gas.
In the former case, it is conceivable that the gas, which is com-
mingled, can leave the state. If the evidence shows that the pressure
flows would permit such a result, the case resembles the Lo-Vaca
case, specifically the facts surrounding the El Paso-Houston Natural
contract. Hence, the commingling of the producer's gas with the
interstate stream would be sufficient and federal jurisdiction over the
wellhead sales would attach because the gas would flow in interstate
commerce. If, on the other hand, the evidence demonstrates that the
commingled stream could not leave the state, notwithstanding the
interconnection, the assertion of jurisdiction over the producer's
wellhead sale must be premised on the affect on interstate commerce
rather than flows of gas in interstate commerce. The affect on inter-
state commerce arises as a result of the displacement of equal
volumes on some other portion of the pipeline system. Since no gas
in the commingled stream leaves the state of production, there could
not be a sale in interstate commerce as defined in Section 2(7) of the
Act.
In light of the clear legislative history of the Act, any attempt to
assert jurisdiction over producer sales in the state of origin should
fail. It was at the behest of state regulators that Congress purpose-
fully employed the language "in interstate commerce" in Section
1(b) of the Act. Congress legislated to close the "attractive gap"
caused by prior Supreme Court decisions as noted above and, if it
wanted to exercise the full scope of its authority under the Com-
merce Clause, the Act would have been drafted to permit regulation
48. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1970).
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of matters "affecting interstate commerce.' 9 While Congress was not
primarily concerned with independent producer sales at the time it
passed the Natural Gas Act,' 0 the Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips, wherein federal jurisdiction over such producers was con-
firmed, does not indicate that its holding was based on the view that
price regulation was necessary to forestall adverse effects on inter-
state commerce. Indeed, the Court referred to Phillips' admission
that the sales were in interstate commerce" and throughout its
opinion, spoke of sales in interstate commerce. Most significantly the
decision clearly recognizes that the measure of the federal jurisdic-
tion was the "gap" resulting from its prior decisions.' 2 To assert that
commingling in the factual circumstances presented in Green System-
East case is the premise upon which jurisdiction rests is misleading.
The only justification could be the affect on interstate commerce but
the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips can only be read as reaching
sales in interstate commerce.
In the second factual situation posited above, concerning wellhead
sales in the state where a pipeline terminates, reliance on the
commingling doctrine is equally misplaced. First, all of the gas sold
by the producer would never leave the state of origin and, hence, the
necessary element of interstate movement of gas required by the Act
would be missing. All of the commingling cases discussed above
involved commingled gas that ultimately was able to leave the state
of production. Application of an "engineering and scientific test,"
even as liberally applied in accordance with the Florida Power &
Light case, will not result in the determination of jurisdiction. Any
assertion of jurisdiction must be premised upon an affect on inter-
state commerce requiring federal regulation. Just like the Green
System-East situation the impact would be on the gas supply avail-
able to the system through displacement. However, it is equally clear
that this assertion of jurisdiction would be incompatible with con-
gressional intent underlying the passage of the Act.
49. Hearings on HR. 5423 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1621-24, 1637-39 (1935), see generally 1604-96; Hearings on
S. 1725 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 756-57,
165-66 (1935), see generally 746-93; Hearings on H.R. 11662 Before Subcomm. of House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81, 86-88 (1936), see
generally 79-98; Hearings on H.R. 4008 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-24 (1937).
Only recently, the Supreme Court has noted that statutes containing "in commerce"
language have a narrower jurisdictional sweep than acts containing "affecting commerce"
language. U.S. v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 43 U.S.L.W. 4838 (1975); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co. Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
50. Libert, supra note 46, at 697-98.
51. 347 U.S. at 677.
52. Id. at 682-84.
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In any event, not every commingling of interstate gas with intra-
state gas per se results in federal regulation. In Natural Gas Pipeline
Company of America,5 I the Commission had before it a proposal of
Natural Gas Pipeline Company to share a storage field with an intra-
state company, Oklahoma Natural Gas Storage Company. The stor-
age field was located entirely within the State of Oklahoma and was
used to supply the Clinton distribution system in Oklahoma. The gas
supply for the Clinton system came from intrastate Oklahoma fields.
Under the arrangement, Natural would inject gas into the storage
field for Storage's account and, upon request, redeliver gas to Stor-
age, who was regulated by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.
While the Staff of the Commission urged that Storage was subject
to federal regulation because some of the Oklahoma gas would be
sold in interstate commerce,' 4 the Commission disagreed. To sup-
port its conclusion, the Commission stated that, unlike the Lo-Vaca
case, there was no sale or delivery to an interstate pipeline of gas to
be commingled with gas carrying on the pipeline's general business
and all facilities used for transporting gas in interstate commerce
would not escape its jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the commingling
of interstate and intrastate gas in the Sayre storage field, the Com-
mission concluded that Storage's joint use of the storage field did not
constitute a sale or transportation of gas in interstate commerce and
"not every transaction which involves commingling of gas from dif-
ferent sources per se requires a finding of jurisdiction." ' I To the
extent Storage did not provide gas to be used as cushion gas in excess
of 6,000,000 Mcf, Storage was not subject to federal regulation.
While there is no explicit finding relative to the Oklahoma producers
supplying Storage, it is a necessary conclusion that these producers
were not engaged in jurisdictional transactions under the Natural Gas
Act.
If commingling of interstate and intrastate gas were the touch-
stone for a jurisdictional finding, the Natural case provides strong
precedent to the contrary. Once gas is commingled in the Sayre field
it would be impossible to identify gas coming from intrastate wells to
be used solely for intrastate purposes. The physical facts as well as
logic would dictate subjecting Storage and its intrastate producer-
suppliers to federal regulation under a strict construction of the
commingling doctrine.
53. 34 F.P.C. 1258 (1965).
54. Id. at 1257-58.
55. Id. at 1262. Compare F.P.C v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1
(1961); Public Service Elec. and Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 371 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 849 (1967); City of Hastings v. F.P.C., 221 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 929 (1955).
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The Commission's decision in the Natural case is consistent with
the Supreme Court's opinion in Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission. I 6 In Peoples, the Court unanimously held that
intrastate gas fed into an interstate pipeline was in intrastate com-
merce. It plainly stated:
As respects the Pennsylvania gas we think it must be held to be in
intrastate commerce only. Feeding it into the same pipelines with
the West Virginia gas works no change in this regard. Of course after
the commingling the two are undistinguishable. But the proportions
of both in the mixture are known and that of either readily may be
withdrawn without affecting the transportation or sale of the rest.
So for all practical purposes the two are separable, and neither
affects the character of the business as to the other. 57
While this case antedates the passage of the Natural Gas Act and was
distinguished by the Commission in Lo- Vaca, I 8 it is a case which is
indistinguishable from the facts of the producer sales discussed here-
in. In fact, the producer sale situation would be a fortiori. The
Peoples' case takes on added significance since it was decided con-
temporaneously with other Supreme Court decisions that created the
"attractive gap" in the regulatory scheme that Congress sought to
close with the passage of the Natural Gas Act.
In the two situations involving producer intrastate sales described
above, it would appear that the producer sales should not be subject
to federal control. First, the fact of commingling is not decisive. If it
were, the Commission's decision in Natural would be inexplicable
because the fungibility of gas in the Sayre field would have required
the assertion of jurisdiction over Storage as well as its producer-
suppliers. Where producers sell gas to interstate pipelines to be used
wholly within the state of production, the commingling would be
indistinguish able from the commingling of gas in the Sayre field, a
portion which moves in interstate commerce. Second, it is difficult
to imagine that all intrastate sales by the producers are motivated by
an intent to avoid federal regulation. Indeed, the Green System-East
case provides a stark example, Before United injected gas into an
otherwise non-jurisdictional pipeline facility, the producers could
reasonably and legally choose to sell their gas to the intrastate
market.5 9 This economic decision may have been motivated by any
56. 270 U.S. 550 (1926).
57. Id. at 554-55.
58. 26 F.P.C. at 840.
59. The Commission cannot force an independent producer to dedicate its gas to the
interstate market. Public Service Commission of New York v. F.P.C., 463 F.2d 824, 829
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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number of considerations, including price, proximity of pipelines to
the field, and avoidance of delay of rental payments. Merely because
United decided to integrate its pipeline facilities, thereby bringing
previously non-jurisdictional facilities within the ambit of federal
regulation, should not operate to transform intrastate sales into inter-
state deliveries.
The same practical considerations apply equally to the case where
sales are made to an interstate pipeline that terminates in the state of
production. It is unseemly to subject the producer sales to federal
regulation since there is even less reason to believe that the sales were
intentionally made to avoid federal regulation. The gas produced was
sold to a pipeline reselling gas intrastate and, in such circumstance, it
is difficult to attribute to the producer an intent to sell gas in inter-
state commerce. If jurisdiction were asserted, producers in the future
would limit their sales to distributors, wholly intrastate pipelines or
direct consumers within the state of production. Viewed from the
overall public interest, this hardly seems desirable.
While arguably a case can be made for the assertion of jurisdiction
over producer intrastate sales, it cannot rest on a commingling theory
but must rest on the premise that the volumes of gas sold affect
interstate commerce as do the rates charged for such gas. With
respect to the rate impact, the Commission can simply remove the
cost of this intrastate gas from the jurisdictional cost of service. This
procedure would be no different than allocating costs between resale
and direct customers on an interstate pipeline and to this extent,
resale purchasers would be protected. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that the state commissions would not protect the consuming
public within the state of production and ultimate consumption. If
state commissions do not presently have regulatory authority, this
matter is one for the legislature of the respective state. There may be
countervailing considerations that would discourage state legislatures
from adopting legislation to regulate intrastate wellhead sales, but
inaction on the part of the states should not be a signal for the
federal government to fill the void. By such logic, the allocation of
regulation of the gas industry scrupulously guarded by Congress
would evaporate.
With respect to the impact on the gas volumes transported by
interstate pipelines purchasing intrastate gas supplies such impact is
known and measurable. All volumes sold to an interstate pipeline
moving in interstate commerce are sales made pursuant to rate
schedules on file with the Commission. The Commission's curtail-
[Vol. 17
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ment jurisdiction would apply to these volumes 6 o and, so long as
these volumes are allocated in a non-discriminatory manner, the
Commission has satisfied its statutorily mandated obligation. Indeed,
if the Commission attempts to justify its assertion over intrastate
producer sales on the basis that it is necessary to make its curtail-
ment jurisdiction effective, this position would be truly anomalous
since the Commission has recognized that control of gas usage at the
burner tip is beyond its jurisdiction. 6 1 It cannot be gainsaid that the
lack of control of gas usage at the local level may undermine its
ability to devise appropriate curtailment plans6 2 just as lack of
control over volumes sold to interstate pipelines to be resold entirely
within the state of production.
As noted above,6 s the price for sales of gas in interstate commerce
for resale is federally regulated but such regulation does not extend
to intrastate sales of gas by producers. Whereas the nationwide rate
for new gas is $1.42 per Mcf, 64 a producer selling gas to the intra-
state market can obtain more than that price for his gas.6 I Given the
economic choice of selling to the interstate or intrastate market, it
seems clear that producers will sell to the intrastate market.6 6
Because of this price differential, interstate pipelines now have
difficulty securing gas from the onshore areas since they simply can-
not "meet the competition." If a pipeline is presently able to pur-
chase gas from producers, which gas is to be sold in the state of
production, this source of gas may evaporate if the Commission opts
to endorse the theory that commingling of intrastate gas with inter-
state gas per se results in federal jurisdiction. Such a result is clearly
not in the public interest since this loss of a supplemental source of
gas will mean that gas distribution companies, primarily dependent
on interstate pipelines for their gas supplies, will be required to make
60. F.P. C. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra note 42.
61. E.g., F.P.C. Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C, 85 (1973), petitions for review dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction sub nom. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. F.P.C., 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1974); United Gas Pipe Line Co., 46 F.P.C. 786 (1971), aff'd. in part and remanded in part
sub nom. International Paper Co. v. F.P.C., 476 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1973).
62. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., Docket No. RP71-119, initial decision issued Aug.
29, 1975.
63. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
64. F.P.C. Opinion 770, issued on July 27, 1976.
65. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Docket No. CP76-186, order issued
Feb. 9, 1976.
66. The change in the price of new gas, however, does not alter the author's original
premise that any assertion of F.P.C. jurisdiction over producer sales in the state of origin
would be detrimental to the interstate market.
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up any such loss (if they can) with high priced propane, synthetic
natural gas or imported liquid natural gas.
A second adverse result flowing from the Commission's assertion
of jurisdiction would be that marginal gas prospects may be left
undeveloped. If a producer can receive the higher intrastate price for
gas, he may be willing to undertake riskier exploration and develop-
ment activities. Accordingly, full resource development can take
place. To ameliorate the present gas supply shortage, more explora-
tory effort is plainly necessary. If the economic incentive to explore
and develop marginal prospects is removed, the result is again less gas
for sale with the ultimate consumer being required to pay higher
prices for supplemental gas supplies.
Finally, since the price of direct sales of gas are not subject to
federal price regulation,6 7 a producer may opt to sell gas directly to
an industrial customer under the procedures established in FPC
Order No. 533.68 Such direct sales will mean that a producer can get
a higher price for his gas but such earmarking of supplies necessarily
impairs the ability of interstate pipelines to serve their customers. If
the producer's gas were sold to an interstate pipeline for resale, all
customers of the pipeline, to the extent that they can, would have an
opportunity to purchase this gas. On the other hand, if a producer
sells directly to an industry and the pipeline simply transports this
gas, other customers of the pipeline receive no benefit since the
pipeline's overall supply has not been increased.6 9 It is ironic,
indeed, that the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction would in-
crease the number of purchases for a limited resource at a time when
more supplies-not more purchases-are required.
CONCLUSION
While there may be a natural inclination on the part of federal
agencies to sweep as much as possible under their jurisdiction, the
integrity of such a federal regulatory scheme requires that it be
confined to those areas specifically designated by Congress. Not only
is it clear that the Supreme Court has refused to conclude that
67. Natural Gas Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970). F.P.C. v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., supra note 42, at 638.
68. Policy with Respect to Certification of Pipeline Transportation Agreements, F.P.C.
Order No. 533, Docket No. RM75-25, issued Aug. 28, 1975, reconsideration granted in part,
F.P.C. Order No. 533-A, issued Nov. 10, 1975.
69. In setting pipeline rates, revenues derived from such transportation service may be
credited to the pipeline's cost of service and the result would be lower wholesale rates. This
small financial benefit pales as gas supplies dwindle, curtailments increase, and ultimate
consumers become more dependent on expensive supplemental gas supplies and/or alternate
fuels.
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locally produced gas injected into an interstate system was intrastate
commerce" I but it is equally obvious that Congress did not give the
Commission authority to take whatever action it deemed necessary
to protect the public interest. 7 ' The extension of the commingling
doctrine to cover intrastate producer sales of gas consumed wholly
within the state of production is unnecessary and clearly conflicts
with Congress' intent to circumscribe federal regulation to make it
complement regulation by the states. Indeed, existing precedent
cannot support such an extension of federal regulation.
Any assertion of federal jurisdiction over intrastate producer sales
will implicate sensitive areas of federal-state relations. Until Congress
steps into the controversy, the Commission and the courts should
candidly recognize Congress' intent to limit the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
70. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
71. Mobil Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 483 F.2d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1973);Mobil Oil Corp. v.
F.P.C., 463 F.2d 256, 263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
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